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South Korea’s developmental success has been widely praised as a re-
markable, if not miraculous, achievement. Emerging from the devasta-
tion of the Korean War as an extremely poor nation, it was able to raise 
itself to the ranks of developed countries in just a few decades. Although 
its early spectacular rise took place under a military dictatorship, it was 
able to make a transition to democracy without losing its economic dy-
namism. Moreover, South Korea was able not only to reduce poverty but 
to keep social inequality in check during its period of rapid economic 
development. This is a combination of accomplishments that most other 
emerging economies have thus far been unable to match. 
How did South Korea lift itself from the ashes of war and destitution 
to affluence? How did a ruthlessly authoritarian regime metamorphose 
with relative ease in the late 1980s into a stable democratic polity? What 
institutions and mechanisms led to the reduction of poverty and inequal-
ity under both authoritarian and democratic rule? Looking at social pol-
icy and styles of governance during the authoritarian period as well as 
after the transition to democracy helps to shed light on South Korea’s 
developmental trajectory
The credit for South Korea’s economic “miracle” typically is given 
to its strong state. Yet attributing the country’s economic growth to the 
strong state alone fails to capture the idiosyncratic nature of Korean 
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authoritarianism—the delicate balance it maintained between force and 
governance. The Korean authoritarian state was repressive, but at the 
same time delivered good governance. We aim to disentangle the intri-
cate complexities of Korean authoritarianism—without glossing over or 
excusing the ugliness and oppression of the military dictatorship—by 
looking not just at the power of the state but at how it exercised author-
ity, and not just at state structures but at how the state actually governed. 
By examining the Korean experience from the 1940s to the early 2000s, 
we will show how authoritarian and democratic regimes have wielded 
power and structured the state-society nexus—the government’s rela-
tionships with business, labor, and civil society—and what the impact 
has been on levels of poverty and inequality. 
Shortly after being liberated in 1945 after 35 years of Japanese co-
lonial rule, the Korean peninsula was divided into two: The Republic 
of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) was founded in 1948 after three years 
of U.S. trusteeship, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK, or North Korea) was founded in 1950 after five years of Soviet 
trusteeship. In June 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea, setting off 
a war that lasted three years and took a heavy toll on the ROK’s agrarian 
economy. To this day, a peace agreement ending the war has still not 
been signed. 
During the First Republic (1948–60) under the presidency of Syngman 
Rhee, the ROK established a capitalist market economy and an anti-
communist but authoritarian state. Although the state was not particu-
larly effective during the early years after the war in achieving eco-
nomic growth and development, it left a lasting impact on the social, 
economic, and political fabric of Korea. Seeking to promote develop-
ment, the state mobilized and worked with nonstate actors, embark-
ing on a cooperative path with the business community and voluntary 
agencies. Business firms became the funders of the country’s social 
safety net as well as engines of economic growth, and voluntary agen-
cies—first foreign (after the war) and then local—were to become the 
state’s tools of social-service delivery. 
The First Republic gradually lost support due to corruption and fa-
voritism, eventually collapsing under the pressure of mass demonstra-
tions across the country in 1960 and giving way to the Second Republic 
(1960–61). With a new and better constitution, the Second Republic 
was an improvement over the First and was a genuine, if short-lived, 
democracy. After a year of factional infighting and unruly public dem-
onstrations, however, in 1961 it fell to a military coup headed by Major 
General Park Chung Hee. Park viewed the Second Republic as an ex-
emplar of ineffective governance and made social discipline, economic 
modernization, and poverty reduction, along with anticommunism, his 
main priorities. 
The authoritarian Park regime (1963–79) achieved a level of eco-
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nomic growth and reductions in poverty and inequality unmatched by 
authoritarian governments elsewhere in the 1960s and 1970s. During 
Park’s tenure, the economy maintained relative price stability, while the 
GDP growth rate soared from 5.7 percent in 1965 to 13.5 percent in 
1976; inequality narrowed, as South Korea’s Gini coefficient fell from 
0.45 in 1960 to 0.32 in 1982; and the rate of absolute poverty dropped 
from an exceedingly high 40.9 percent of all households in 1965 to only 
9.8 percent by 1980 (see the Table).1 
After Park’s assassination in 1979, economic and social development 
continued under the Chun Doo Hwan military dictatorship (1981–87). 
A favorable international trade climate resulting from low energy prices 
and a strong Japanese yen spurred more rapid economic growth in the 
1980s. At the same time, the Chun government introduced the concept 
of the “welfare state” to public discourse and began to plan and imple-
ment various social-welfare programs. Of course, Chun was motivated 
less by a commitment to socially guaranteed minimum standards of 
welfare than by the desire to increase his government’s legitimacy and 
social control.
The transition from authoritarianism to democracy in the late 1980s 
led to the broadening of the social-insurance programs that aided a 
small segment of society into national-level programs that offered 
greater coverage; to the giving of greater bargaining power to trade 
unions; and to the weakening of the established network linking the 
state and capital, particularly the large business conglomerates called 
chaeb¢ol. Income inequality was significantly reduced by rising wages, 
and the introduction of new social policies by the democratic regime 
1960 1965 1970 1980 1991 1996 2000 2008
GDP growth 
rate (%) 1.2 5.7 8.8 -1.9 9.7 7.2 8.8 2.3
Incidence of 
poverty (%) n/a 40.9 23.0 9.8 5.3
1 3.3 7.6 5.0
Gini coefficient 
(all households) 0.45 0.34 0.33 0.32
2 0.26 0.28 0.323 0.32
Source: In-hoe Ku, Income Inequality and Poverty in Korea (in Korean) (Seoul: Seoul 
National University Press, 2006); Jean Dr`eze and Amartya Sen, Hunger and Public Ac-
tion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Bank of Korea, available at http://ecos.
bok.or.kr/; Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, Yearbook of Poverty Statistics 
(Seoul: Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, 2009); Statistics Korea, available at 
http://kosis.kr. 
1Figure for 1990.
2Figure for 1982.
3Figure for 1999.
Table—economic GrowTh and inequaliTy 
in SouTh Korea (1960–2000)
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(as well as the extension of effective existing policies) yielded higher 
levels of redistribution. 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997 brought a sea change to every 
aspect of Korea’s social development. For the first time—and in the 
midst of the crisis, no less—an opposition party won, with the Na-
tional Congress for New Politics–United Liberal Democrats coali-
tion, led by Kim Dae Jung (1998–2003), taking power. It implemented 
policies to address the fallout from the financial crisis and reformed 
economic and social structures. Social safety-net measures such as un-
employment insurance and social-assistance programs, often dubbed 
“productive welfare,” constituted the core of the Kim government’s 
reform package. The traditional norm of lifelong employment, which 
had sustained Korea’s earlier economic development, was replaced by 
a flexible labor market and various compensatory social-policy pro-
grams. These changes significantly affected the profile of the poor 
and vulnerable and presented new challenges and opportunities to the 
democratic government. 
The State, Social Policy, and Governance
The Korean state was, on the one hand, a “hard-power” state that con-
trolled and manipulated societal forces and, on the other, a “soft-power” 
state that provided effective governance throughout society.2 Even au-
thoritarian governments, if they are prudent, will want to be viewed as 
holding power legitimately and governing effectively. Thus the South 
Korean state sought to gain support and secure its grip on power by 
providing good governance. 
Many authoritarian regimes try to promote the welfare of their citizens 
in order to gain and sustain legitimacy. By doing so, they also lessen the 
need to use coercive power. To be sure, South Korean authoritarian re-
gimes, under constant pressure from below, never felt completely secure 
and used force ruthlessly when they thought it necessary. But such coer-
cion does not account for the success of South Korean authoritarianism in 
achieving effective governance and economic modernization. These were 
products of the state’s collaboration with nongovernmental partners. 
This combination of coercive power and the delivery of effective 
governance is a key feature of South Korea’s authoritarianism. Al-
though the state ultimately was in command of its partners, it did work 
with them. It is true that the real decision-making power rested in the 
presidency,3 and the president’s personal views and preferences often 
trumped sound policy recommendations from inside and outside the 
government. The Korean welfare state was formed within this frame-
work of a state-led society and a president-led state. But the manage-
ment of the welfare state was in the hands of an extensive alliance of the 
state, the business sector, and the voluntary sector. 
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The relationship between the South Korean state and the business 
community has been well-researched. The parallel alliance of the state 
and the voluntary sector, however, has not. As in the case of business, 
voluntary agencies extracted concessions from the Korean authoritarian 
state, which relied on them to deliver social services because it lacked 
the means to do so itself. Voluntary agencies accepted the task and 
worked within the framework of state regulations while also carving out 
their own domain, in which they grew and flourished. Thus both busi-
ness and voluntary agencies became indispensible partners of the state.
In this way, South Korea had a kind of “mixed governance.” Its 
society was not monolithic but pluralistic, with a varied and vibrant 
civil society. Throughout the authoritarian period, even in times of 
harsh suppression of trade unions and other civic movements, there 
was constant pressure for democracy from below that eventually 
helped the country to make a transition to democracy. When authori-
tarianism collapsed in the face of massive and intense prodemocracy 
movements in 1987, the institutions of a reasonably pluralistic social 
order already existed, easing the way for the new democratic dispen-
sation.
Corporatism and the Welfare State
Park and his successors built South Korea’s strong state, and they 
were brutal in their determination to hold on to power. Thus trade 
unions, along with any other opposition groups, were suppressed. But 
the state’s strategy was sophisticated, and aimed at mobilizing and 
coopting nonstate actors rather than merely marginalizing or outlaw-
ing them. The state was able to coopt the business community by 
fostering state-led chaeb¢ol monopoly capitalism, which was corrupt 
but nevertheless effective. The state mobilized voluntary agencies by 
allowing them to operate in return for their providing social services 
and staying apolitical. Similarly, it gained the cooperation of civil 
servants and policy experts by making them partners in governance. 
Both rural and industrial populations were mobilized through the Sae-
maul Undong (“New Community Movement”), a government-initiat-
ed national campaign for mass mobilization that put local communi-
ties to work on infrastructure-building projects under the slogan of 
“self-reliance.” 
Within this governance structure, the economy grew at an unprec-
edented pace, and the rate of poverty dramatically decreased. Although 
the direct effects of Park’s social policies were not always obvious, it 
cannot be denied that his government sowed the seeds of the Korean 
welfare state. In 1963, the country’s first social-insurance program, the 
Industrial Accident Insurance scheme, was introduced in order to ease 
workers’ resistance to industrialization and to reduce employers’ finan-
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cial burden. That same year, the government introduced the experimen-
tal National Health Insurance Act, which covered public-sector workers, 
private-school teachers, and employees of large firms. It became com-
pulsory in 1977. Occupational-pension schemes for civil servants, mili-
tary personnel, and private-school teachers were implemented in 1960, 
1963, and 1975, respectively, to buy their loyalty.
The Livelihood Protection System (LPS), a poverty-relief program, 
was enacted in 1961. Yet it provided income support only to the elderly, 
the disabled, pregnant women, and children. Having a certain minimum 
standard of living was not considered to be a social right, and social 
policies were aimed at supporting economic growth more than citizen 
welfare. Therefore, social insurance was selective and did not extend 
to workers in the more marginal reaches of the economy, and social 
assistance was strictly means-tested. Furthermore, the number of social-
assistance recipients tended to be restricted because the available budget 
was generally deemed short of what was needed to protect all the poor.4 
As a result, social policies had little impact on poverty reduction and 
income inequality.5 
Although the authoritarian government introduced only a minimal 
range of social policies, it managed and coordinated these policies well, 
enabling the country to combine economic development and poverty 
reduction. Various economic and rural-development initiatives—such 
as land reform, rice-purchasing schemes, formal educational institu-
tions, public-health facilities, and insurance for industrial accidents and 
national health—were integrated to help provide social protection and 
reduce poverty.6
Those South Koreans who escaped poverty did so mainly through 
hard work and self-reliance, which define the Korean ethos. In other 
words, gains in poverty reduction stemmed largely from overall eco-
nomic development and individual benefits derived from work and oc-
cupational (employment-based) welfare. The Korean brand of occupa-
tional welfare was an outgrowth of the state’s ideological politics, which 
not only encouraged people to work and rewarded them for their efforts, 
but also promoted social responsiveness along with the national goal of 
economic growth. It reflected corporatist forms of mixed governance 
aimed at mobilizing capital and neutralizing labor. Reliance on occupa-
tional welfare under authoritarian rule helped to relieve the state from 
some of its responsibilities for welfare provision. This model has con-
tinued into the democratic period. 
The strong developmental alliance between the government and 
business was not a command-compliance relationship but rather a 
symbiotic one.7 The Korean government shifted the burden of welfare 
funding and delivery onto business. In return for the welfare assis-
tance that it provided, business received direct subsidies or tax relief 
on production and exports, which not only benefited the businesses 
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themselves but also helped the government to achieve its goal of eco-
nomic growth. Clearly, this arrangement was mutually beneficial and 
provided a basis of legitimacy for both parties—economic growth for 
the government and the accumulation of wealth for business. South 
Korea’s authoritarian leadership was wise to accommodate and to 
coopt the immense economic power of the chaeb¢ol. Labor did not 
fare as well under authoritarianism, as trade unions were marginalized 
and repressed by the government and suffered from persistent internal 
divisions. During the transition to democracy, however, labor grew 
stronger and engaged in militant industrial action. 
The mixed-governance system of occupational welfare was founded 
on two pillars: social insurance and corporatist paternalism. First of all, 
a series of government-designed insurance programs—industrial acci-
dent and health insurance, followed by national pensions and unemploy-
ment compensation—was imposed on employers and workers, who had 
to pay for them and manage them for the most part as well. Second, 
the authoritarian government emphasized the importance of a familial 
enterprising spirit that rejected the economic individualism prevalent 
in Western societies; it delegated welfare responsibilities to both work-
ers and employers, and allowed state intervention in labor-management 
relations. 
This corporatist version of occupational welfare developed through-
out the authoritarian period. With the passage of the Labor Standards 
Act in the early 1950s, the Rhee government forced employers to 
improve working conditions more than they wanted. In the 1970s, 
the Kongjang Saemaul Undong (“New Factory Movement”) further 
strengthened the country’s corporatist paternalism through a success-
ful campaign of mass mobilization and workplace-improvement proj-
ects across the country. Firm-based educational facilities, along with 
the meals, clothing, sports, and recreational and bath facilities pro-
vided by most firms, were manifestations of corporatist paternalism. 
Even in the 1980s, when the Chun government trumpeted the building 
of the welfare state, it was still primarily the occupational sector that 
was to expand and deliver welfare. In most firms, Labor Management 
Councils (LMCs) were forcibly established by state agencies as an 
extended arm of state control. The LMCs became the only legitimate 
arbitrators of labor-management conflicts.8 
Employers did not always comply with the government’s directives 
and guidelines. In 1982, for example, the Korean Employers’ Federation 
refused to accept the government’s Company Welfare Funds worker-
benefit scheme, which was to be funded by employers. Labor unions, the 
other corporatist partner, likewise began to resist the government’s will, 
particularly in the wake of the democratic transition in the late 1980s. 
By that time, unions had become more powerful, and large companies 
preferred to accept union wage demands rather than risk strikes and the 
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interruption of production. Despite the government’s attempt to impose 
wage controls in the 1990s, wages escalated by more than 10 percent a 
year on average during Kim Young Sam’s presidency (1993–98). The 
financial crisis of 1997 brought an end to the wage boom, however, and 
Kim Dae Jung’s government won some concessions from the national 
union associations to make the labor market more flexible—including 
both layoffs and an increase in nonregular workers. Finally the Kim Dae 
Jung government institutionalized the Tripartite Commission as the of-
ficial body for corporatist intermediation. 
Democratization did not disrupt occupational welfare. Rather, social-
insurance programs continued and matured, with the occupational-ben-
efits system prevailing over statutory insurance, even during the hard 
times of the 1997 financial crisis. The underlying rationale of mixed 
governance did change after the transition to democracy, however, and 
the paternalistic structure of occupational welfare gave way to more 
balanced negotiations and agreements. In addition, as unionization was 
normalized, occupational-welfare schemes in some cases developed into 
statutory rights. In short, occupational welfare remained at the core of 
the system, while the state took on new responsibilities regarding wel-
fare provision. 
The Voluntary Sector
Regardless of how strong the Korean state may have been at any 
given point, social-welfare and poverty-reduction measures never came 
from the state alone. Rather, it was the government’s willingness to 
partner with business and civil society that paved the way for reduc-
ing poverty and inequality in South Korea. The common narrative of 
Korean political history pays plenty of attention to the alliance between 
state and business in this regard, but neglects the relationship between 
the government and other nonstate actors. Thus the state’s alliance with 
voluntary agencies is a virtually unknown facet of governance in South 
Korea.9 In fact, from their earliest days on the scene, voluntary agencies 
were incorporated into South Korea’s system of mixed governance. 
Conventional wisdom has it that voluntary associations became sig-
nificant social actors beginning in the late 1980s as a result of democra-
tization. Yet the voluntary sector was established in Korea even before 
the authoritarian period, was never completely controlled by the author-
itarian regimes, and persevered up to the reemergence of democracy.10 
More important still, the state deliberately guided and mobilized the 
voluntary sector to deliver social services. The state’s institutional ad-
aptations and its integration and cooptation of the voluntary sector were 
another part of the pattern of mixed governance. 
Voluntarism in South Korea began with postwar emergency-relief 
activities. After the Korean War, there was an influx of foreign relief 
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agencies into the country, and the mission of relieving the dire poverty 
and ruin that the war had left in its wake fell to them. In 1952, foreign 
agencies formed the Korean Association of Voluntary Agencies to en-
hance and coordinate relief projects. By 1961, their combined annual 
budget was more than twice that of the Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs. Foreign voluntary agencies began to retreat from the ROK in 
the early 1960s, however, as the advent of military authoritarianism 
brought with it tighter regulation over the sector. With their departure, 
local Korean voluntary agencies stepped in. 
The flight of foreign agencies cut the flow of aid money from abroad, 
thereby leaving local groups to operate under serious resource constraints 
and forcing them to comply with government conditions for financing. 
The fragmented Korean voluntary associations needed government sub-
sidies if they were to have any success in reducing poverty and inequal-
ity. For example, the Park government partially bankrolled the Saemaul 
Undong when they were first introduced in the 1970s, but by doing so 
it deliberately shifted extensive welfare responsibilities from the gov-
ernment onto voluntary groups and local communities. Moreover, the 
government’s financial backing of the Saemaul Undong enabled it to 
limit the scope of the voluntary agencies’ work to service provision and 
to keep them away from political advocacy. By mobilizing voluntary 
forces in this way, the Park regime accomplished two goals: It kept the 
voluntary sector in check and, more important, it significantly reduced 
poverty. 
With the democratic breakthrough in 1987 came an expansion of 
the voluntary sector. In the eyes of the state, this presented two alter-
native possibilities: a latent adversarial powerhouse that would chal-
lenge the government on social issues, and a potential bank of human 
resources that would cooperate with the state to deliver social services 
to the people. The state responded to the politicization of welfare is-
sues by coopting and incorporating leading voluntary federations into 
the government’s policy-making process, but continued to mobilize 
the more conventional service-oriented groups for the task of social-
service provision. This dual strategy allowed the government to use 
different institutional arrangements for handling the two branches 
of voluntarism. This bifurcation of the voluntary sector continued 
through the period of the financial crisis. 
The corporatist ethos underlying South Korea’s mixed governance 
blurred the boundaries between the state and civil society, impelling 
both sides to work together.11 Corporatism has served as an effec-
tive institutional device to bring about compromise between conflict-
ing social actors. Shifting welfare responsibilities onto the voluntary 
sector was a way not only of getting the job done cheaply, but also 
of integrating its institutions into a grand, shared national project of 
poverty reduction and modernization. The state was strong but could 
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only achieve its developmental goals with the contribution of non-
state actors. Although the precise form of mixed governance in South 
Korea has fluctuated over time, corporatism has long defined the re-
lationship between the state and the nonstate sectors. 
Democracy and Mixed Governance
At various critical junctures throughout South Korea’s history, pro-
democracy groups asserted themselves vehemently, but they were re-
peatedly repressed by the state, their demands denied. By 1987, how-
ever, the autocratic order had weakened, and nationwide demonstrations 
erupted as Chun named Roh Tae Woo as his successor. Given the unrest, 
Roh announced that he would concede to many demands for reform, in-
cluding the direct election of the president. Thus the efforts of the huge 
prodemocracy coalition, made up of the political opposition and civil 
society organizations, led to the breakdown of authoritarian rule and a 
democratic transition. 
Before the transition, South Korea’s form of mixed governance, 
though often discordant and disorderly, had managed to operate as an 
effective corporatist system. After 1987, democracy could endure and 
consolidate because its foundation had already been laid. Because the 
mode of governance during the authoritarian period had mobilized and 
even empowered nonstate institutions, the latter could engage with the 
democratic state and develop normal and balanced state-society rela-
tions. Indeed, as democracy deepened, state-society relations matured; 
the government no longer acted as autocratic overlord, and nonstate ac-
tors no longer served as its handmaidens. Korea successfully converted 
itself into a democracy with normalized democratic governance.
Has normalized governance worked well? The ability of the strong 
state at the center to impose its will has been curbed, as it should be in a 
democracy. The authoritarian state was effective in promoting economic 
growth, but it was also seriously deficient due to its corrupt practices 
and, of course, its repressive use of force. Democracy, generally if not 
always, has proved superior to autocracy in effectiveness as well as rep-
resentation and fairness.12 Although it may not be perfect, South Korea’s 
democratic state has succeeded in implementing many overdue reforms, 
particularly after the economic crisis of 1997.
The Asian financial crisis had devastating economic and social reper-
cussions, such as increasing unemployment and widening income dis-
parities. The crisis prompted South Korea to reform its welfare system, 
although other regional powerhouses such as Hong Kong and Singapore 
weathered the crisis without undertaking welfare reform.13 In the ROK, 
however, the crisis also marked a political turning point. The election 
of Kim Dae Jung as president in December 1997 marked the first han-
dover of power from the conservative ruling elites to an opposition party 
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since the establishment of South Korea in 1948. The transfer of political 
power helps to explain why Korea alone undertook welfare reform. The 
economic crisis created grave problems that demanded some kind of re-
sponse from a democratic government, and a reshaping of social policy 
was an obvious step. Neighboring authoritarian regimes, by contrast, 
felt no need to respond to citizen demands.
Due to high unemployment caused by the economic crisis and sub-
sequent corporate restructuring, the Korean government was no longer 
able to meet the population’s social needs through economic growth. As 
the job market shrank and unemployment rose, inequality widened and 
more and more people fell into poverty, as the social safety net was still 
largely tied to the workplace. In Korea, employment has always been 
central to welfare provision—as the source both of income and of access 
to social benefits through social-insurance programs.14 
Given the minimal role of state welfare and the strong emphasis on 
self-reliance, there were insufficient public provisions available for the 
newly unemployed in a country that had maintained almost full employ-
ment prior to the economic crisis. For most of South Korea’s history, 
family support and occupational welfare had compensated for the lack 
of government-provided welfare. In the wake of the crisis, however, 
they were ill-equipped to protect citizens from the fallout.
In the end, however, it was political dynamics more than economic 
necessity that shaped the direction of welfare reform in Korea. Rather 
than the social role of the state contracting, as might have been expected 
for economic reasons, it instead expanded. Three key factors led to this 
outcome: first, the social-policy paradigm and political strategy of Pres-
ident Kim Dae Jung; second, advocacy on the part of a strong and newly 
empowered civil society; and finally and decisively, the combined and 
cooperative efforts of influential forces from above (state elites) and 
new forces from below (civil society organizations) to understand and 
combat the crisis. 
With the new policy, the state took a notable step toward becoming 
a welfare provider, particularly of social assistance and unemployment 
compensation. Under the reformed Korean welfare system, the state’s 
primary role is still a regulatory one, but it now has a secondary role as a 
provider as well. Despite the shift, the government maintained a strong 
commitment to economic growth and development.15 As a result, unem-
ployment compensation was improved and extended, and discretionary 
poverty relief was replaced with a modern rights-based system of social 
assistance. With the new National Basic Livelihood Security (NBLS) 
Act of 1999, the state took on the responsibility of ensuring a “social 
minimum.” In principle, the new assistance program guarantees income 
support to all who need it. Under the old LPS, support was not provided 
to those able to work, and therefore excluded able-bodied citizens be-
tween the ages of 18 and 64. Public expenditure on social assistance 
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more than doubled in the five years after the crisis, increasing from 1.3 
percent of the state budget in 1997 to 3.3 percent in 2001.16
Although the postcrisis reform strengthened income-maintenance 
programs such as social assistance and unemployment benefits by ex-
tending their coverage and raising ben-
efit levels, the social-security system as 
a whole remained incomplete. Despite 
increasing social expenditures in re-
cent years, South Korea’s overall wel-
fare-related spending as a proportion 
of GDP still lags behind that of other 
developed nations. According to the 
2009 OECD Factbook, in South Korea 
only 6.9 percent of GDP went to gross 
public social expenditure—the lowest 
share of any OECD country.17 To be 
entitled to social-assistance benefits in 
Korea, claimants must prove that they 
do not receive private assistance from 
extended-family members called “supporters.” Moreover, the income 
capacity of these so-called supporters is also taken into account, regard-
less of their actual income. 
The total number of social-assistance recipients has not changed 
much over the years, even when compared to coverage under the old 
system. Between 1997 and 2009, the number of people receiving so-
cial assistance increased by only about 200,000—going from 1.4 mil-
lion at the beginning of the period to 1.6 million at the end.18 Under the 
NBLS system, only 3.2 percent of the total population was covered, 
while roughly 9 percent of the population was estimated to be living in 
poverty throughout the first decade of the 2000s. Because of its strict 
eligibility criteria, the new system has left a large share of the country’s 
poor unprotected. The NBLS guaranteed all recipients its main income 
support—that is, the Livelihood Benefit—which under the old system 
was not provided to those who were able to work. The number of those 
eligible for the Livelihood Benefit thus increased from 0.5 million people 
in 1999 to 1.5 million people in 2000. Despite the increasing number of 
those receiving the Livelihood Benefit, however, the total number of 
social-assistance recipients did not change much in comparison with the 
coverage under the previous system—1.41 million recipients in 1997 
and 1.57 million in 2009. 
Adding to the challenge of providing for the needy, a growing num-
ber of Koreans have become “nonregular” (temporary) workers, who are 
often referred to as “outsiders.” “Insiders,” by contrast, are the regular 
workers who are protected by social insurance. As the Table on page 122 
shows, income inequality has increased significantly since the Asian 
It was this character-
istic of South Korean 
authoritarianism—good 
governance via part-
nerships with business 
and civil society—that 
spurred economic growth 
and development, not its 
willingness to use coer-
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financial crisis—with the country’s Gini coefficient increasing from 
0.28 in 1996 to 0.32 only three years later. This widening gap can be 
attributed largely to greater wage disparities between regular and non-
regular workers in the context of economic globalization and neoliberal 
structural reforms. Although social insurance is not directly designed 
to provide a minimum income, it does provide a high degree of income 
security, and social transfers other than means-tested benefits play a 
significant role in alleviating poverty and inequality.19 Many temporary 
workers, however, are not covered by social-insurance programs.20 As 
of August 2010, less than 36 percent of nonregular workers were cov-
ered, compared to between 83 and 98 percent of regular workers.21 
Although Kim Dae Jung’s reform measures were impressive, trans-
forming the state’s role and increasing its contributions to the social-
security system, the outcomes have fallen short of expectations. Despite 
the reforms, welfare policy still had problematic characteristics (notably 
its limited coverage) that restricted its impact on poverty and inequality. 
Under democratic governments, the ROK has seen a deepening bifurca-
tion of the labor market and a consequent increase in income inequality. 
Although political democratization led to an expansion of welfare poli-
cies, even democratic consolidation may not be a sufficient condition 
for effectively mitigating income inequality. 
The Lessons of the Korean Experience
Scholars have arrived at different conclusions as to whether authori-
tarian or democratic regimes are better for economic growth and pov-
erty reduction. Many believe that strong states—whether authoritarian 
or democratic—are the key to achieving development goals in poorer 
countries. In the case of South Korea, however, a strong state was only 
half the equation. In order to understand the country’s success and draw 
lessons for developing countries, we must acknowledge the dual na-
ture of South Korea’s authoritarian state and look at how it exercised 
authority: It used brutal force (hard power) when necessary in order to 
maintain its rule, yet it coopted and worked with nonstate actors in order 
to deliver social services to the people (soft power) and also to bring 
economic growth to the country. 
Through this mode of mixed governance, the strong state was able to 
make great strides in the reduction of poverty and also had some suc-
cess in narrowing inequality. It was this characteristic of South Korean 
authoritarianism—good governance via partnerships with business and 
civil society—that spurred economic growth and development, not its 
willingness to use coercive force. Paradoxically, in adopting this form 
of corporatism, South Korea’s authoritarian government laid the ground-
work for the transition to democracy by allowing a well-organized civil 
society to emerge.
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Policy makers and scholars alike tend to assume a fixed dichotomy 
between democracy and authoritarianism (or between strong states and 
weak states) rather than looking at how the state can work with other 
stakeholders in society. Yet the South Korean experience shows that 
a state willing to partner with nonstate actors in managing economic 
development and poverty reduction can achieve remarkable success, re-
gardless of regime type. A number of poor developing countries would 
likely benefit if their governments were to ally with local stakeholders 
in this way. In short, a close look at social policy, economic growth, 
poverty, and inequality during South Korea’s period of authoritarian 
rule reveals that the country’s successes stemmed not from the state’s 
coercive strength but rather from policies that allowed business and vol-
untary agencies to become integral players in the country’s governance. 
Although this model confirms that good governance is the key to effec-
tively addressing socioeconomic ills, it does not come down obviously 
on the side of either authoritarianism or democracy. Yet by implement-
ing such a form of mixed governance, states are not only choosing a path 
that will result in economic development and social solidarity, but also 
one that will prepare the way for democracy. 
Democracy by itself, of course, cannot guarantee prosperity and 
equality. For all its economic and political progress, South Korean so-
ciety is now faced with new challenges. The widening income gap be-
tween regular and nonregular workers as well as an aging population 
threaten to undermine what the country has so far achieved. The state 
needs to accept greater responsibility for social-welfare programs that 
families, the business community, and the voluntary sector have been 
implementing up to now. At the same time, it is important to note that, 
in an era of neoliberal labor policies, social policy alone cannot close 
Korea’s widening income gap. 
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